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SONY V. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS: CAN THE MARKETPLACE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREATOR AND CONSUMER
BE PRESERVED?
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Betamax videocassette recorder (VCR) was introduced
to the American market by Sony Corporation, a Japanese firm. The
Betamax has the ability to record entire television programs and tele-
vised motion pictures off-the-air for later viewing.' VCR technology
represents the first time in the history of copyright law that sizeable
copyrighted works can be copied in their entirety off-the-air in the pri-
vacy of the home.
2
Traditionally, copyright owners have received remuneration for the
use of their works through the marketplace.3 However, direct market-
place remuneration from VCR users for the use of broadcast copy-
righted works is a practical impossibility.4  Indirect marketplace
remuneration to copyright owners from broadcasters for VCR audiences
is at best uncertain. 5 Thus, VCR technology has created a situation
1. The Sony Betamax videocassette recorder combines a tuner capable of receiving
broadcast signals with a cassette recorder capable of making and playing back a copy of the
broadcast programs received by the tuner. The public has the right to receive broadcasts.
47 U.S.C. §§ 153(o), 605 (1982). However, there is no express statutory public right to
copy video broadcasts.
2. Traditionally, copies of entire copyrighted works were made and distributed com-
mercially outside of the home, as by book or sheet music publishers. More recent copying
technologies, such as photocopying or cable television retransmission, see infra notes 126-
46 and accompanying text, have also involved commercial copying and distribution
outside the home. Audio recording technology permits copying of copyrighted music off-
the-air in the home, and thus is relatively analogous to VCR technology. However, VCR
technology is unique in that the copyrighted works which VCRs can copy are lengthy and
very expensive to make.
3. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this tide
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of... motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly ....
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
4. VCR use is characterized by wide dispersion of the copying activity in private
homes throughout the country, and by the difficulty of channeling remuneration from the
VCR user to the copyright owner of the particular work copied by the VCR user. The high
transaction costs of transferring remuneration to copyright owners from VCR users, and
the low profits which copyright owners would receive from each such transaction, create a
market barrier to transfer of remuneration. For a detailed analysis of the effect of market
failure on copyright law, see Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analyss of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
5. When a program recorded by VCR is viewed later, the viewer is able to fast-for-
ward through commercial messages with little difficulty. The viewer is also able to delete
commercial messages if the viewer wishes to manually do so as the program is being re-
corded. The ability of VCR viewers to delete commercials interferes with the complex
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wherein copyrighted works can be consumed on a vast scale with no or
only partial remuneration to copyright owners.
6
Exclusive copyright protection is granted to authors and other cre-
ators on the theory that remuneration encourages the creation and dis-
semination of artistic and scientific works, which ultimately benefit the
public. 7 Some limited exceptions to copyright protection do exist, how-
ever, which allow use of copyrighted works without remuneration to the
copyright owner.8 In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,9 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether VCR use
should fall within the copyright protection or its exceptions.' 0 The
Court could have found that the public interest would be best served by
including VCR copying within the copyright protection, on the theory
that remuneration to owners of broadcast copyrighted works would en-
courage the creation of additional works.' ' Instead, the Court chose to
permit the de facto marketplace status of VCR use with uncertain remu-
neration to copyright owners to continue, by holding VCR use to fall
within exceptions to the copyright monopoly.
12
This article will evaluate the Sony Court's majority and dissenting
opinions by tracing the development of the cases through the district
court and court of appeals, and by comparing the Court's treatment of
VCR technology with its treatment of two similar technologies, photo-
copying and cable television retransmission. This article will then out-
line the "marketplace relationship" between creator and consumer, and
propose congressional action to restore that marketplace relationship by
establishing a system for royalty payments to copyright owners.
broadcasting industry system for remuneration to copyright owners. Under the system,
viewers remunerate copyright owners indirectly through the payment of increased prices
for advertised goods and services to manufacturers. The manufacturers in turn remuner-
ate the advertisers, who remunerate the broadcasters, who remunerate the copyright own-
ers. Amicus Brief of General Electric Co., et al. in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 13, Sony Corp. of America
v. University City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984) ["Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit" hereinafter
cited as "Petition for Writ of Certiorari"]. However, if VCR viewers are not watching
commercials, advertisers may be unwilling to pay for the VCR audience. See infra note 162
and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
8. For example, limited exceptions to the owner's exclusive copyrights are allowed
under the "fair use" doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See infra note 28.
9. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
10. Sony Corporation's Petition for Writ of Certiorari presented four basic questions
to the Court. First, is home VCR copying of broadcast copyrighted works by individuals
for household viewing at a later time an infringement of statutory copyright on such pro-
gramming? Second, if so, does the manufacture and sale of a VCR per se constitute con-
tributory infringement? Third, does household VCR use of broadcast copyrighted works
constitute a "fair use" of such works? Fourth, can a royalty payment system be imposed
on a VCR manufacturer as a remedy for statutory copyright infringement? Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i.
11. The positions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (see infra notes 41-54 and
accompanying text) and of the Supreme Court dissent (see infra notes 86-112 and accompa-
nying text) favor remuneration to copyright holders.
12. 104 S. Ct. at 796. See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
The Constitution empowers Congress "To Promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." 13 In response to this mandate, Congress passed the first
Copyright Act in 1790.14 The Act granted exclusive copyright protec-
tion to authors of books, maps and charts, with respect to printing, pub-
lishing, and vending these works. 15 Over the years, Congress has
gradually expanded the scope of exclusive copyright protection' 6 to
cover additional media and developing communications technologies.
17
In 1955, Congress began its most recent revision of statutory copy-
right protection. 18 The result, after extended legislative consideration,
was the 1976 Copyright Act. 19 The Act provided copyright owners the
exclusive rights to reproduce or to authorize the reproduction of the
copyrighted work. 20 However, although VCR technology was known at
the time the Act was passed, the Act did not specifically mention the
rights of copyright owners with regard to home VCR use.2 1 Thus, it was
not clear whether Congress had intended to include home VCR use
within the scope of exclusive copyright protection.
22
13. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1982)).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (extending protection to prints);
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (extending protection to musical compositions); Act
of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (extending protection to dramas and plays); Act of
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (extending protection to photographs); Act ofJuly 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212, (extending protection to painting, drawing, and sculp-
ture); Act ofJan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (extending protection to public performances
of dramatic and musical compositions); Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (ex-
tending protection to motion pictures); Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (extending protection to sound recordings).
17. Among the communication technologies which have been developed while copy-
right laws have been in existence are: sheet music, photographs, piano rolls, silent movies,
movies with sound, sound recordings, radio and television transmission, rapid and effi-
cient copying machines, microfilm, videotapes and computers. For a discussion of the
adaptation of copyright law to new technologies, see Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction
of Protected Works, 68 A.B.A.J. 42 (1982).
18. The comprehensive revision was a complex and controversial effort. Congress
was aided in its efforts by the Office of the Register of Copyrights. See, e.g., REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. CoPY-
RIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961) (printed for the use of the House Comm. on the Judiciary).
19. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). The
effective date of the Act was Jan. 1, 1978.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982). See supra note 3. The exclusive copyright is subject to
certain exceptions. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982). A consideration of the entire 1976
Copyright Act is beyond the scope of this article.
21. This legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act contains no definitive statement
on home VCR use. See, e.g., Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and
H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 22-
23 (testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights) (Assistant Register
Ringer indicated that infringement from VCRs was not a problem in the early 1970s.).
22. Prior to the filing of the complaint by Universal City Studios, a few courts had
considered the interaction of copyright law with VCR technology. See, e.g., Walt Disney
Prod. v. Alaska Television Network, 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) (mem.) (cable
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It was in this atmosphere of statutory uncertainty about the rapidly
developing VCR technology2 3 that two copyright owners, Universal City
Studios and Walt Disney Productions, brought suit to preserve their
copyrights from home VCR infringement. 2 4 Named as principal de-
fendants were Sony Corporation and its American distributor. 25 The
plaintiffs claimed that off-the-air recording of plaintiff's programs by
Sony Betamax consumers constituted direct infringement of plaintiffs'
copyrights. 2 6 Plaintiffs further claimed that Sony was liable for contrib-
uting to this infringing conduct by consumers.
2 7
A. The Decision of the District Court
The United States District Court for the Central Division of Califor-
nia concluded that off-the-air recording by Sony Betamax consumers did
not constitute copyright infringement. Instead, the district court found
off-the-air recording to be a noninfringing "fair use."
28
In making its finding, the district court examined the four factors
indicative of fair use set forth in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright
television system operator may not transmit by making a videotape copy of a broadcast,
and retransmitting at a later time).
23. VCR technology has been in a state of revolutionary expansion since its introduc-
tion. According to current estimates, there are fifteen million VCR households in the
United States. The Video Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1984, at 50, 52. See infra note 174.
24. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). Universal City
Studios produces and licenses motion pictures for theater showings and for television
broadcasts. Walt Disney Productions has licensed many of its theatrical motion pictures to
network television. 480 F. Supp. at 433-35. [For convenience, plaintiffs are hereinafter
cited as Universal.]
25. In addition to Sony Corporation and its American distributor, Sony Corporation
of America (Sonam), defendants included: Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc., Sony's advertising
agency; several retailers who demonstrated and sold Betamax VCRs; and William Griffiths,
an individual who had used his VCR to copy plaintiffs' copyrighted materials. 480 F. Supp.
at 433-39.
26. lId at 432. Reproduction of copies without authority from the copyright owner
constitutes an infringement of the owner's copyrights. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
27. 480 F. Supp. at 432. Infringement of copyright is a tort. See, e.g., Porter v. United
States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973) (Lee Harvey Oswald's widow barred from
recovery for printing of Oswald's writings in Warren Commission Report). A contributory
infringer is "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materi-
ally contributes to the infringing conduct of another .. " Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (management
company liable as contributory infringer for arranging performances for musicians for fee,
and printing concert programs which included copyrighted works, without obtaining copy-
right clearance). The 1976 Copyright Act does not define contributory infringement. For
a survey of contributory copyright infringement case law, and a criticism of the Supreme
Court's finding of contributory infringement liability against Sony Corp., see Note, Contrib-
utory Infringement Liability in Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Sony Corp.: "The One and Only"
Pays for Our Sins, 14 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 79 (1982).
28. 480 F. Supp. at 456. Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that repro-
duction of a copyright owner's work is not infringing if such reproduction is made in con-
nection with a "fair use." Fair use includes such purposes as "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, .... scholarship, or research .... " Section 107 indicates that the
factors to be considered in deciding whether a use is an infringement or a noninfringing
fair use include:
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Act.29 As to the first factor, purpose and character of the use, the dis-
trict court found that the noncommercial, private-use nature of VCR re-
cording weighed in favor of fair use treatment.3 0 As to the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the district court felt the fact
that televised works are broadcast voluntarily and without direct charge
to viewers indicated fair use treatment.3 1 As to the third factor, the
amount and substantiality of the portion used, the district court noted
that, although copying of an entire work weighed against a fair use find-
ing, such copying was not absolutely preclusive of a finding of fair use if
the copyright owner was not harmed by the copying of the entire
work.3 2 As to the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work, the district court found no
reduction in the market for Universal's copyrights. The finding that
Universal suffered no harm from VCR use indicated to the district court
that VCR use should be treated as fair use.
3 3
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
29. 1976 Copyright Act § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
30. 480 F. Supp. at 453-54. It could be argued that home VCR use is "commercial" in
nature because viewers are (a) making copies of works for which there is an indirect charge
through higher prices on advertised goods, and then (b) distributing the copied works to
themselves at a later time. However, the fact that a given use is of a commercial nature
does not necessarily negate a fair use determination. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (commercial mo-
tive relevant, but not decisive as to fair use); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-09 (2d Cir. 1966) (fact that author or publisher reaps economic
benefits from the sale of a work containing the copyrighted material of another not con-
trolling as to fair use determination), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); New York Times
Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.NJ. 1977) (fact that defend-
ants seek to profit financially will not preclude their use from being a fair use.).
31. 480 F. Supp. at 452-53. See infra note 48.
32. 480 F. Supp. at 454-56. Traditionally, the greater the amount of the work copied,
the less likely is a finding of fair use. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 756-58 (9th Cir. 1978) (dictum) (if a large amount of the work is copied, a fair use
finding may be precluded), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (extensive verbatim copying of copyrighted material
not within fair use privilege), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enter., 366 F.2d at
310 (dictum) (substantiality weighs against fair use); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780
(8th Cir. 1962) (copying of substantially all of a copyrighted song not fair use merely be-
cause infringer had no intent to infringe); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484,
486-87 (9th Cir. 1937) (use of list of names from telephone company directory by defend-
ants in publishing their own directory not fair use); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp.
v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (videotaping of copyrighted educa-
tional films in their entirety weighs in favor of injunction of such videotaping); Loew's Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 182-83 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (a substantial
appropriation of a work for purposes of burlesque not fair use), af'd sub nom. Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958). On the other hand, copying of complete works on a vast scale was found to be fair
use in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (copying of
medical journal articles by national library for physicians nationwide permitted), affid by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). See infra notes 131-34.
33. 480 F. Supp. at 450-52. The district court noted that Universal's and Disney's
1985]
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In addition, the district court found a possible implied VCR use ex-
emption from exclusive copyright protection in the 1971 Sound Record-
ing Amendment to the Copyright Act.3 4 The Sound Recording
Amendment exempted noncommercial home reproduction of sound re-
cordings, a practice arguably analogous to home VCR use.
3 5
The district court further concluded that even if off-the-air record-
ing were considered copyright infringement, the actions of defendant
Sony did not constitute contributory infringement. 36 The court analo-
gized from the patent law "staple of commerce" doctrine. Under patent
law, a manufactured article is a "staple of commerce" unless the article
does not have substantial non-infringing uses. 37 The seller of a "staple
article of commerce" is not liable if the article is later used by the buyer
in an infringing manner.3 8 The court reasoned that expansion of con-
tributory infringement liability to manufacturers of devices used by
some consumers to infringe copyrights would exceed the proper bound-
aries of such liability. 39 It stated that such an expansion of liability
would be judicially unmanageable and would hamper commerce.40
B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court.4 ' The court of appeals ruled that off-the-air
copying by Sony Betamax consumers of copyrighted broadcast pro-
grams constituted infringement under the 1976 Copyright Act.
4 2
profits were climbing despite VCR use, and that any harm from VCR use to copyrights was
speculative. Id. at 452.
34. 480 F. Supp. at 444-46. The 1971 Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-
553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2560 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
35. Congress did not wish to restrain home audio recording because such recording is
made for private use with no intention of capitalizing on it commercially. H.R. Rep. No.
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.
However, the current codification of sound recording copyrights does not mention an ex-
ception for home copying. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
36. 480 F. Supp. at 459-61.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
38. Compare Aralac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America, 166 F.2d 286, 295-97 (3d Cir. 1948)
(manufacturer of a fiber used in making fur felt hats not a contributory infringer because
the fiber is capable of noninfringing uses); with Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485-91 (1964) (supplier of replacement fabrics specifically suited
for use in infringing repairs of convertible tops by car owners liable for contributory
infringement).
39. 480 F. Supp. at 461.
40. Id. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912) (dictum) (a rule which
would hold the manufacturer of an article adapted to both infringing and noninfringing
uses to be a contributory infringer would "block the wheels of commerce"), overruled on
other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-
18 (1917).
41. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982), reargu-
ment ordered, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). For a criticism of the
court of appeals decision's primary reliance on the plain meaning rule as its chief analytical
tool, see Note, Encouraging Delinquency in the American Home: Sony's Contributory Infringement of
Copyrights, 18 Wil.tAmrE LJ. 673 (1982).
42. 659 F.2d at 969. Exemptions from liability under the 1976 Copyright Act are
limited to those set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982). See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th
878
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The court of appeals concluded that home copying was not a nonin-
fringing fair use because such copying by Betamax consumers was not
done for "productive" purposes. 43 By "productive" purposes, the court
meant those purposes which make use of the copyright owner's work to
produce a further work, such as when a scholar copies copyrighted ma-
terial in writing a thesis. "Intrinsic" purposes, on the other hand, are
purposes which make use of the copyright owner's work without produc-
ing a further product, such as when a viewer watches a televised movie
for entertainment. 4 4 Because intrinsic uses do not add to "Science and
the useful Arts" as productive uses do, the Ninth Circuit felt intrinsic
uses do not merit fair use exemption from exclusive copyright
protection.
45
The court of appeals also concluded that off-the-air copying was not
a fair use in light of the factors set forth in section 107 of the 1976 Copy-
right Act. 46 As to the first factor, the purpose and character of the use,
the court ruled that copying for mere convenience does not qualify for
fair use treatment, even if done in a private, noncommercial setting.
4 7
As to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court
reasoned that a fair use would be less likely where the work was primar-
ily of entertainment value.4 8 As to the third factor, the amount and sub-
Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5674. Universal
argued that none of these exemptions permits uncompensated reproduction of copy-
righted works for purely private use except § 111 (e), which permits cable television re-
transmitters to make videotapes of programs for purposes of later retransmission. 17
U.S.C. § 11 (e) (1982). Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 11.
43. 659 F.2d at 969-72.
44. See generally L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978). The
"productive/intrinsic" use dichotomy is not without its problems. Librarians point out
that it would be difficult for libraries to know, for example, whether a patron intended to
use a requested copy for a permitted "productive" use or a forbidden "intrinsic" use.
Amicus Brief of American Library Ass'n in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7.
45. 659 F.2d at 971-72. Because the Framers of the Constitution intended exclusive
copyright protection to promote "Science and the useful Arts," the judicial doctrine of fair
use was developed to permit use of a copyrighted work when exclusive copyright protec-
tion interferes with that intent. See Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83-84 (1st
Cir. 1981) (dictum). See also Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting
Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair use doctrine allows courts to prevent copyright
law from stifling creativity); Rosemont Enter., 366 F.2d at 307 (dictum) (courts may
subordinate copyright owner's interest to public interest in development of art, science
and industry).
46. The four factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107 can be found supra at note 28. Con-
gress, in drafting the 1976 Copyright Act, recognized that movies, such as those produced
by Universal, are particularly vulnerable to copyright infringement. Thus, for example,
libraries may not make copies of movies. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (1982). Motion pictures and
other audio-visual works are also specifically excluded from the exception to copyright
protection contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(1), 112(a), and 118 (1982).
47. 659 F.2d at 972. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that
off-the-air recording for convenience should not be considered fair use "under any cir-
cumstances." S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1975). Fair use does not permit
off-air videotaping merely because videotaping increases public access to information and
entertainment. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, 542 F. Supp. at 1175-77, 1179-81 (vide-
otaping of copyrighted educational films for distribution to schools enjoined).
48. 659 F.2d at 972. The line between information and entertainment is difficult to
draw, however. Stanley v. Georgia, 397 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (dictum) (individuals allowed
to possess pornography in privacy of the home). If a work serves the public interest in
1985]
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stantiality of the portion used, the court noted that VCR use usually
involves copying the entire work, and that such copying weighs against
fair use.4 9 With regard to the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, the court con-
cluded that because the VCR copy is to be used as the functional
equivalent of the original, the existence of potential harm was estab-
lished for fair use purposes as a matter of law, making fair use treatment
inappropriate.
50
The court of appeals further ruled that Sony Corporation was liable
as a contributory infringer. 51 It found that Betamaxes as complete units
were adapted specifically for copying broadcast programs, almost all of
which are copyrighted. 5 2 It reasoned that because Sony knew Betamaxes
would be used to infringe copyrights, and because Sony manufactured
and sold Betamaxes enabling consumers to infringe copyrights, Sony
accessibility to information, fair use is more likely to be found. See Rosemont Enter., 366
F.2d at 307 (informational value of biography of Howard Hughes weighs in favor of per-
mitting fair use of copyrighted material in biography). When an educational film ap-
proaches a commercial nature, however, the fair use exception to exclusive copyright
protection is less appropriate. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found, 621 F.2d at 61 (commer-
ical broadcast of portion of educational film held not fair use). If the work is purely en-
tertainment, fair use treatment is unlikely. See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532,
536-37 (9th Cir. 1956) (use of part of a movie for use in satirical work not fair use), afd by
an equally divided Court sub nom., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 356
U.S. 43 (1958); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217,
221 (work of diligence more likely to fall under fair use than creative work); Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (entertainment film does
not warrant fair use treatment), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
49. 659 F.2d at 973. Many courts have held that copying of substantially all of the
work precludes a fair use finding. See supra note 32.
50. 659 F.2d at 974 n.13. This "functional equivalent" test has been applied in some
cases to deny fair use treatment. See, e.g., Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1068-71 (district court
erred in holding substantial verbatim copying of copyrighted letters fair use as a matter of
law); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351, 360-
61 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (musical comedy based on "Gone with the Wind" does not warrant fair
use protection because musical comedy has the same entertainment function as "Gone
with the Wind" and is therefore likely to harm the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work). Where the infringing activity would have a significant impact on the
copyright holder's economic interest, fair use is generally inappropriate. See, e.g., Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1977) (tendency of infringing "McDonaldland" commercials to decrease market for
original "H.R. Pufnstuf" series weighs against fair use); Marvin Worth Prod. v. Superior
Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (where distribution of infringing
film containing copyrighted material of Lenny Bruce could be expected to decrease value
of copyrighted material, fair use not appropriate); Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dictum) (perhaps the most important factor
bearing on fair use is whether the use tends to interfere with the market for copyrighted
work); see also S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975) ("a use which supplants any
part of the normal market for a created work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement").
51. 659 F.2d at 975-76. For a definition of contributory infringement, see supra note
27.
52. 659 F.2d at 975. The court of appeals reasoned that because Betamaxes are
adapted specifically for copying copyrighted broadcast programs, Betamaxes are not capa-
ble of substantial non-infringing use. If Betamaxes are considered not to have substantial
noninfringing uses, Betamaxes would not fall within the district court's "staple article of
commerce" analogy from patent law. Id. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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was liable as a contributory infringer. 53 The court of appeals ordered
the district court to consider on remand remedies of injunction or statu-
tory damages. 54
Within weeks after the court of appeals issued its opinion, Universal
sued 42 other manufacturers, distributors and advertisers engaged in
VCR supply, representing essentially the entire balance of the VCR in-
dustry.55 Congress reacted to the court of appeals decision by consider-
ing a number of bills. Some of the bills sought to exempt home video
recording from copyright liability without compensating copyright own-
ers,56 essentially overturning the court of appeals. Other bills, while
completely exempting VCR consumers from liability, sought to require
payment of compulsory royalty fees by VCR manufacturers and distribu-
tors.5 7 Hearings were held in 1981 and 1982 on these bills.58
53. 659 F.2d at 975-76. In prior contributory infringement cases, several elements
were often present which are lacking in Sony. First, the contributory infringer had the right
and ability to control and supervise the infringing activity. Second, the contributory in-
fringer had a financial interest in the infringing activity. Third, the contributory infringer
expressly or impliedly authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.
See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554
F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977) (racetrack retained direct infringer to supply music to paying
customers); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (company managing musicians printed and distributed programs con-
taining titles of copyrighted musical compositions to be performed by managed musi-
cians); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1974)
(screenwriter used material which he knew had been used in copyrighted movie in writing
screenplay for producer); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1963) (owner of chain stores retained direct infringer to run store record departments
in return for fixed percentage of gross record department receipts); Dreamland Ball
Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Berstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929) (dance hall hired
orchestra to supply music to paying customers); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co.,
432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to
paying customers); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (proprietor of
cabaret licensed premises for performance of infringing song), afd 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1981); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (advertisers and distributors of bootleg records can be held liable for con-
tributory infringement if they know they are dealing in illegal goods); Davis v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (sponsor and its advertising agency
approved infringing program); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5775-76.
54. 659 F.2d at 976. Statutory damages could run from $100 to $50,000 per infring-
ing recording. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982).
55. The "RCA et al. case," No. 81-5723 FW (C.D. Cal. 1981).
56. S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11810-11 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1981); H.R. 4783, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7504 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1981);
H.R. 4794, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H7504 (daily ed. Oct. 20. 1981): H.R.
4808, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7591 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1981); H.R. 5250,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9928 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981).
57. Amendment No. 1242 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S15723-
24 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981); Amendment No. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. S1675 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1982); H.R. 5488, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. H333 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1982); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
H664 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1982).
58. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 1981-82: Hearings on S. 1758
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1-1384 [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings]; Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, 1982: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-1359 [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
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II. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In March of 1982, faced with the adverse decision of the court of
appeals, Sony Corporation successfilly petitioned the Supreme Court
for a Writ of Certiorari. After extensive consideration, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.59 in early 1984.60
A. The Position of the Majority
The majority decided that Sony's sale of Betamax VCRs does not
constitute copyright infringement.6 1 As background for its decision, the
majority noted several points. The exclusive copyright protection, or
copyright monopoly, is "intended to motivate the creative activity of au-
thors and inventors by the provision of a special reward .... "62 The
grant of this reward, however, is made to achieve the important public
purpose of inducing release of creative works. 6 3 Therefore, defining the
scope of the exclusive copyright protection requires a balancing of the
interest in rewarding copyright owners on the one hand and the interest
in the free flow of commerce and information on the other. 64
The majority proceeded to consider the issue of Sony's possible
contributory infringement of Universal's copyrights. 6 5 Adopting the
district court's "staple article of commerce" argument, 6 6 the majority
noted that under patent law, "[a] sale of an article which though adapted
to an infringing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not
enough to make the seller a contributory infringer."'6 7 The majority
59. 104 S. ct. 774, (1984).
60. Oral argument was first heard in January of 1983. Reargument was heard in Octo-
ber of 1983. For a summary of the history of the Betamax case, see Betamax Case Reargued
Before Supreme Court, 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 498 (1983).
61. 104 S. Ct. at 778, 796.
62. Id at 782.
63. Id (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
64. 104 S. Ct. at 782.
65. The majority distinguished Sony from an old copyright contributory infringement
case, Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). In Kalem, the producer of an unau-
thorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book BEN HUE was found liable for the
producer's sale of the film to distributors, who arranged for commercial exhibition of the
film. The producer did not have the right to authorize use of the copyright owner's work;
this exclusive right is the possession of the copyright owner. The Sony majority distin-
guished Kalkm by noting that in Sony the alleged contributory infringer, Sony, is not au-
thorizing use of a copyright owner's work, but merely supplying a mechanism capable of
copying copyrighted broadcast works, some of which may be Universal's. 104 S. Ct. at
785-86.
The majority also distinguished Sony from past contributory infringement cases in
which the contributory infringer was generally in a position to control use of the copy-
righted works, had a financial interest in use of the copyrighted works, and/or authorized
use of the works without permission from copyright owners. See supra note 53. The major-
ity noted that no Sony employees had direct contact with purchasers of Betamaxes after
the sale, when any infringing conduct would have taken place. In addition, the majority
found no evidence that Sony's advertisements encouraged infringing activities. 104 S. Ct.
at 786-87 & n.18 (citing 480 F. Supp. at 460).
66. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
67. 104 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overmed
on othergrounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
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then set forth a balancing test regarding the sale of articles of commerce
which may be used to infringe copyrights. The test balances the interest
in effective reward to copyright owners on the one hand with the interest
of others to freely engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce
on the other.6 8 These interests are properly balanced, and no contribu-
tory infringement exists, the majority held, if the article of commerce
sold is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.69 Thus, the question
for the majority became: is the Betamax capable of substantial nonin-
fringing use?
70
The majority reasoned Betamax timeshifting satisfied this "substan-
tial noninfringing use" standard, and that therefore Sony Corporation
could not be held liable as a contributory infringer. 7 1 The majority
noted that the district court's findings indicated timeshifting, the pro-
cess of recording a program at an earlier time for later viewing, is the
"primary" use of Betamaxes. 7 2 The majority considered timeshifting a
"substantial non-infringing use" because (a) substantial numbers of
copyright owners apparently do not object to timeshifting of broadcast
programs by VCR viewers, and (b) even unauthorized timeshifting con-
stitutes fair use.
7 3
If a copyright owner authorizes copying of his work, then the copy-
ing of such work is noninfringing, because the copyright owner has in
effect waived his exclusive copyright protection. 74 The majority noted
that the district court found a significant number of copyright owners of
broadcast programs willing to authorize VCR copying for timeshifting.
7 5
(1917). A patentee cannot control distribution of unpatented articles unless they are "un-
suited for any commercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980).
68. 104 S. Ct. at 789. This balancing test appears to be a modification of the "scope
of copyright protection" balancing test to fit the VCR "article of commerce" situation. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69. 104 S. Ct. at 789. The majority expressed concern that if it held Sony to be a
contributory infringer, Universal would have effective control over the sale of VCRs, sim-
ply because VCRs may be used to infringe copyrights. Id. at 788. The majority stated that
even the remedy of a royalty payment on the sale of VCRs would essentially be a payment
to Universal for Universal's relinquishment of its controlling copyright interest in the dis-
tribution of VCRs. Id. n.21.
70. Id. at 789.
71. Id. at 789, 796. As an additional weight against a finding of contributory infringe-
ment, the majority set up a threshhold test for copyright owners bringing an action for
contributory infringement against a seller of copying equipment. In such an action, the
majority stated, "the copyright holder may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects
only his programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in
the outcome." Id. at 791. The majority discounted the amicus briefs filed on Universal's
behalf from groups of entertainment programming copyright owners. Id at 785 & n. 16.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Motion Picture and Television Producers and Distributors in
Opposition to Writ of Certiorari; Brief of the Motion Picture Ass'n in Opposition to Writ
of Certiorari. Instead, the majority pointed to producers who authorize timeshifting. See
infra note 74 and accompanying text. Because Universal did not speak for these authoriz-
ing copyright owners, Universal did not meet the majority's threshhold test. 104 S. Ct. at
791.
72. 104 S. Ct. at 779.
73. Id at 789.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See supra note 3.
75. These authorizing copyright owners include owners of sports, religious and edu-
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Because authorized copying is non-infringing, and because a significant
number of copyright owners authorize VCR copying for timeshifting,
the majority felt it would be unfair to stifle the sale of Betamaxes.
76
Having noted that there is a significant authorized and therefore
non-infringing timeshifting use for Betamax, the majority next consid-
ered whether unauthorized timeshifting was "fair use," and therefore
non-infringing use. As had the lower courts, the majority considered
the four factors indicative of fair use set forth in section 107 of the 1976
Copyright Act. 7 7 As to the first factor, the purpose and character of the
use, the majority noted that timeshifting is a noncommercial, nonprofit
activity. 78 As to the second factor, the nature of the work, the majority
pointed out that viewers are invited to see broadcast works free of direct
charges. 79 As to the third factor, the portion of the work copied, the
majority stated, upon consideration of the fact that the viewer is invited
to see broadcast works for free, that copying of the entire work does not
preclude a finding of fair use.80 As to the fourth factor, the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyright, the majority
did not feel that Universal had shown any present harm to its copyrights
or any meaningful likelihood of future harm to its copyrights. 8 1 In addi-
tion to its evaluation of the above four factors, the majority noted that
increased access to broadcast programs through timeshifting yields soci-
cational programs. 104 S. Ct. at 789-90 (quoting 480 F. Supp. at 468). The majority
especially noted the enthusiastic authorization of Fred Rogers, of "Mr. Roger's Neighbor-
hood." 104 S. Ct. at 790 n.27 .
76. 104 S. Ct. at 791.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Seesupra note 28. The restatement of the doctrine of fair
use in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) was not intended to change, narrow or enlarge the previous
judicial doctrine of fair use. The factors mentioned in the statute to be considered in
determining fair use are illustrative and not exhaustive. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ.
Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1168 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (dictum). During the develop-
ment of the 1976 Copyright Act, experts had indicated to Congress that personal or pri-
vate use should be fair use. See, e.g., Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646
and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
22-23 (testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights) (Assistant Regis-
ter Ringer indicates that home recordings should be treated as fair use.).
78. 104 S. Ct. at 792. Libertarians will be pleased to note that the majority does not
consider home VCR copying commercial, another step in the retreat from Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-25 (1942) (government can set quota on wheat consumed on the
same farm where it was raised).
79. 104 S. Ct. at 792.
80. Id. at 792-93.
81. Id. at 793-95. In connection with the fourth factor, the majority set forth a burden
of proof for a plaintiff seeking to prove harm from a noncommercial use of copyrighted
material. The plaintiff must demonstrate either that the particular use is harmful to either
the present market for or the value of the copyrighted work, or show by a preponderance
of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm to the potential market or
the value of the copyrighted work exists. Id at 793. Universal failed to carry this burden
of proof because (a) no present harm existed, as Universal admitted, and (b) the district
court findings showed no meaningful likelihood of future harm. In support of (b), the
majority cited district court findings that (1) current audience measuring systems allow the
Betamax audience to be analyzed; (2) although some Betamax viewers may fast-forward
through commercials, advertisers can make judgments about Betamax audiences similar to
those the advertisers currently make about whether people watching TV shows watch ad-
vertisements; and (3) there is no factual basis to believe that Betamax use will decrease live
television or movie audiences, or audiences from telecast reruns. Id. at 794 & n.36.
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etal benefits.
8 2
Balancing all these factors together in an "equitable rule of rea-
son," 83 the majority concluded that Betamax timeshifting by consumers
is fair use.8 4 Because much Betamax timeshifting use is authorized and
therefore non-infringing, and because even unauthorized timeshifting is
non-infringing fair use, the majority held that the Sony Betamax is capa-
ble of substantial non-infringing uses. Therefore, Sony's' sale of
Betamaxes to the public does not constitute contributory infringement
of Universal's copyrights.
8 5
B. The Position of the Dissent
The dissent8 6 argued it was very possible that Sony's sale of
Betamax VCRs constituted contributory infringement of Universal's
copyrights. 8 7 As a basis for its argument, the dissent proposed a test for
determining whether it is appropriate to impose contributory infringe-
ment liability on the manufacturer of an article which can be used to
infringe copyrights. 88 According to the dissent's test, a manufacturer
cannot be held contributorily liable for infringing uses of the article if a
significant portion of the article's use is noninfringing.8 9 But if almost
all of the article's use is infringing, the manufacturer may be held con-
tributorily liable.9 0 Thus, the question for the dissent became: how
much of Sony Betamax use is infringing?9 1
The dissent argued that at least that portion of Betamax use which
consists of unauthorized timeshifting should be considered infringing
use.9 2 The dissent considered inappropriate the majority's holding that
82. 104 S. Ct. at 795 (citing Community Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S.
498 n. 12, 508 (1983) (dictum) (there is a public interest in making television broadcasting
more available)). Fair use is a compromise between the public's first amendment right to
access to knowledge of general import and the right of an author to protection of his
intellectual creation. H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp.
620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afd, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Keep Thomson Gover-
nor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (first
amendment interest of freedom of expression in a political campaign weights in favor of
fair use treatment).
83. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that the fair use doc-
trine as endorsed in § 107 of the Act is to be applied as an "equitable rule of reason" on a
case-by-case basis. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5679. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1977) (dictum) (line between fair use and copyright infringement depends on an ex-
amination of the facts in each case), cert. denied, 434 U.S 1013 (1978).
84. 104 S. Ct. at 795.
85. Id. at 796.
86. l t at 796 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist,
BJ.).
87. Id at 815, 818.
88. The dissent realized that if liability were imposed on the manufacturer of every
product which could be used to infringe copyright, commerce would be halted. Id at 814.
89. lt
90. Id.
91. Id See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text. As background, the dissent noted
the statutory protections for copyright owners under the 1976 Copyright Act. 104 S. Ct. at
799-800. Under section 106(1), copyright owners have the exclusive right to authorize
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
unauthorized timeshifting is fair use.93 In support of its argument that
unauthorized timeshifting is infringing use rather than noninfringing
fair use, the dissent employed the "productive/intrinsic" use distinction
set forth by the court of appeals.94 Fair use exceptions to the exclusive
copyright protection, the dissent argued, should be limited to uses
which result in some productive, socially-laudable benefit to the public
beyond the benefit produced by the first author's work.95 Because VCR
copying by the consumer for private use results in no creative benefit to
society, the dissent argued, VCR copying should not be held to be fair
use.
96
As additional support for its argument that unauthorized timeshift-
ing is not fair use, the dissent considered the factors indicative of fair
use set forth in section 107.9 7 As to the first factor, the purpose and
character of the use, the dissent argued that although VCR copying may
be noncommercial and nonprofit, it is a noncommercial use resulting in
an individual benefit only, not a societal benefit appropriate to fair
use.98 As to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
dissent felt that original, creative works of entertainment, the most likely
type of work to be copied by VCR consumers, are especially deserving of
copyright protection rather than fair use treatment.99 As to the third
factor, the portion of the work copied, the dissent argued strongly that
VCR copying of copyrighted works in their entirety is the opposite of
fair use because fair use is intended to permit copying of small portions
of origi. ' works for productive purposes.10 0 As to the fourth factor,
reproduction of copyrighted works. See supra note 3. This exclusive right would include
the right to authorize the making of a VCR copy. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5675 ("[T]he right 'to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . .' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated. . . in a fixed form from which it can be 'perceived
. . . either directly or indirectly with the aid of a machine .... ' ") The dissent noted that
there are only a few, narrowly-restricted situations in which a copy of a copyrighted work
can be made without infringement under the 1976 Copyright Act. 104 S. Ct. at 800. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1982) (libraries have right to make single copy of work under
limited conditions); 17 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1982) (retransmitters have right to make single
copy of work under limited conditions). In addition, the dissent found no private home
use exemption for VCR copying in the 1976 Copyright Act. 104 S. Ct. at 800-806.
93. 104 S. Ct. at 815. For a discussion of the majority's fair use holding, see supra
notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
94. Id at 807-08. For a discussion of the court of appeals "productive" versus "in-
trisic" distinction, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
95. Id In addition to the requirement that a fair use be "productive," the dissent
proposed a balancing test that "productive" uses should pass to attain fair use status.
Under this test, the risk of depriving authors of their incentive to create would be balanced
against the risk of reducing the creative activity of others. Id. at 808.
96. Id at 808.
97. For the majority's consideration of these factors, see supra notes 76-86 and accom-
panying text.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 816-17. The majority had argued that the noncommercial, nonprofit
nature of VCR copying weighed in favor of fair use.
99. Id at 817. The majority felt the fact that viewers were invited to watch broadcast
programs free of direct charge weighed in favor of fair use. The dissent argued that the
fact that a copyright owner has licensed such broadcast of his work is irrelevant to the
existence of his right to control reproduction. Id at 808.
100. Id at 817. The majority felt that when the fact that viewers are invited to watch
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the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
right, the dissent felt that VCR copying without remuneration to copy-
right owners has an adverse effect on the value of Universal's copyrights,
because the value of Universal's copyrights would be greater if Universal
were compensated for VCR copying.10 ' The dissent argued that such
an adverse effect is not consistent with fair use.10 2 Therefore, both be-
cause unauthorized timeshifting is not productive use and because the
four factors of section 107 indicate fair use treatment is inappropriate,
the dissent concluded that unauthorized timeshifting is not fair use.
10 3
The district court had not made any finding as to the percentage of
noninfringing versus infringing Betamax use. ' 0 4 Before a decision as to
Sony's contributory copyright infringement liability could be made
under the dissent's test, such a finding was required to determine
whether a significant portion of Betamax use is non-infringing.' 0 5 With
this in mind, the dissent suggested remand to the district court for a
determination of the percentage of non-infringing versus infringing
Betamax uses. 1
06
If virtually all VCR use were found to be infringing, the dissent felt
contributory infringement liability could be imposed upon Sony.
10 7
Under copyright case law, the dissent argued, "contributory infringe-
ment liability may be imposed even when the defendant has no formal
control over the infringer."108 The contributory infringer need merely
broadcast programs for free was considered, VCR copying of works in their entirety did
not preclude a fair use finding. The dissent pointed out that an invitation to view a copy-
righted program for free does not necessarily include an invitation to copy it. Id. at 808,
817 n.49.
101. Id. at 817-18. The majority stated that Universal had failed to show any present
harm to their copyrights or any meaningful likelihood of future harm to their copyrights.
See supra note 81. The dissent proposed a different burden of proof: when the proposed
use is not "productive," the copyright owner need only show "a potential for harm to the
market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. at 809 (emphasis in the original). Show-
ing a reasonable "potential for harm" would be a significantly lighter burden for copyright
owners than showing actual present harm or a meaningful likelihood of future harm under
the majority test. The dissent felt that if there is uncertainty as to the possibility of harm,
the risk should shift away from the copyright owner. Thus a lighter burden of proof on
copyright owners isjustified, at least when the use is not "productive." 104 S. Ct. at 809-
10.
102. 104 S. Ct. at 811. In addition to its evaluation of the above four factors, the dis-
sent argued that increased public access to television programming is an inappropriate
reason for fair use treatment. Free public access to copyrighted works strikes at the very
heart of the copyright system, because the value of a copyright is inversely proportional to
the availability of free public access to the work. Id. at 808-09.
103. Id at 809, 811, 815.
104. 480 F. Supp. at 468.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 814-15. Although the dissent felt unauthorized timeshift copying was
infringing use, possible noninfringing uses include authorized timeshifting copying, re-
cording works not protected by copyright, and uses qualifying as "fair use" under the
dissent's narrow definition of fair use. Id at 814 n.43.
106. Id at 815.
107. Id at 814.
108. Id at 812 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160 n.Il (1975)).
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have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 0 9 Sony had rea-
son to know that Betamaxes would be used to infringe copyrights, the
dissent argued, particularly because off-the-air copying is the intended
use of the Betamax. 1"0 Sony induced infringement by Betamax consum-
ers with its advertisements suggesting off-the-air recording.'' Sony's
inducement of infringing activity, while having reason to know infringe-
ment would occur, the dissent concluded, would merit imposition of
contributory infringement liability if virtually all Betamax use were
found infringing on remand."
12
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
1. Contributory Infringement
Under the majority decision, a copyright plaintiff will have a difficult
time proving a manufacturer of copying equipment liable for contribu-
tory infringement. To avoid liability under the majority test, the manu-
factured article need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. 1 13 Unless Congress acts to limit the majority decision, a manufac-
turer of copying equipment is unlikely to be found liable for contribu-
tory infringement in the future."
14
Under the dissent's opinion, a copyright plaintiff would be able to
prove a manufacturer of copying equipment liable for contributory in-
fringement in very limited circumstances. Under the dissent's test, lia-
bility may be found if virtually all the article's use is infringing.
15
109. 104 S. Ct. at 812 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Screen Gems-Columbia Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
110. 104 S. Ct. at 813 (citing 480 F. Supp. at 459-60).
111. 104S.Ct.at813.
112. 104 S. Ct. at 813, 815. A contributory infringer is "one who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another."
113. 104 S. Ct. at 789 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra notes 67-69 and accompany-
ing text. Under the majority decision, copyright owners are basically left to obtain what
remuneration they can within the perameters of unfettered copying technology marketing
and use. For example, if advertisers feel that VCR owners are fast-forwarding through
commercials, copyright owners will simply not receive remuneration for the VCR audi-
ence. 104 S. Ct. at 794 n.36.
114. The majority opinion also forecloses use of a vicarious liability theory as a basis
for recovery of damages by copyright owners. 104 S. Ct. at 787. A strict products liability
theory (cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A) seems out of the question given the
reluctance of both the majority and dissent to "block the wheels of commerce." 104 S. Ct.
at 788-89 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overuled on other grounds
by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)). 104
S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The inability of the courts to resolve the conflict
between copyrighted works and communications technology innovations without congres-
sional legislation is discussed infra at notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
115. Id at 814 (Blackmun, J, dissenting). See supra notes 107-17 and accompanying
text. Under the dissent's opinion, copyright owners would be able to obtain remuneration
for consumption of their works if a continuing royalty or continuing damages remedy
could be devised for copyright infringement liability. Id at 817 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissent thus leaves a window for possible remuneration to copyright owners in the
egregious situation where a communciation technology is univerally purchased for pur-
poses of copyright infringement. The historical pattern of congressional provision for
remuneration to copyright owners is discussed infra notes 135-36, 146-50 and accompany-
ing text.
888
SONY v. UNIVERSAL STUDIOS
Contributory infringement is slightly less difficult to prove under the
dissent's test, because liability may be found based on actual infringing
use, regardless of the capabilities of the copying equipment."l 6
2. Fair Use
Under the majority's decision, a copyright plaintiff will also have a
difficult time proving direct infringement by noncommercial users.
Under the majority's interpretation of fair use, noncommercial copying
of any type of copyrighted work in its entirety is not within the copyright
protection unless it is (a) causing present harm to the value of copy-
rights, or (b) likely to cause harm in the future.' 17 If the copyright
owner cannot demonstrate such harm, the economic loss from noncom-
mercial copying will be borne by the copyright owner.1 18
The dissent's opinion argues that extensive copying of copyrighted
works for convenience is not fair use.' 1 9 Because the majority's treat-
ment of fair use permits such a broad range of noncommercial copying,
as the scope of such copying increases, the dissent's more traditional
treatment of fair use may become more persuasive. 1
2 0
3. Criticism
Sony is a case involving conflict between two types of intellectual
creativity: the creation of artistic entertainment, and the invention of
communications technology.' 2 1 In order to encourage such socially
beneficial acts, the marketing of both types of intellectual creativity is
protected. 12 2 The question is: how can each type of creativity be en-
116. 104 S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. The majority declined to limit the fair use exception to copyright protection to
socially "productive" uses. 104 S. Ct. at 795 n.40. For a discussion of the "produc-
tive"/"intrinsic" use dichotomy, see surpa notes 43-45 and accompanying text. The ma-
jority was willing to allow as fair use home-copying of entire entertainment works, unless
the copyright owners made a showing of actual present harm or some meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
118. 104 S. Ct. at 810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority's calculation of harm to
the value of the copyright does not include the value the copyright would have had if the
copying in question was within the copyright protection. Id. at 794.
119. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
120. The range of noncommercial copying allowed under the majority's fair use hold-
ing is discussed supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. The growth of VCR copying
alone continues to be revolutionary. See supra note 23. Additional technologies facilitating
noncommercial copying will no doubt appear in the near future. See infra note 121.
121. This conflict between creativity protected by copyrights and inventiveness pro-
tected by patents also potentially exists with other communications technologies, such as
photocopiers, cameras, audio recorders, satellite and cable transmitters, the use of com-
puters to receive and transmit copyrighted computer programs, etc. As new communica-
tions technologies are developed, the list of such conflicts can only lengthen. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 58, at 364-66 (statement of Hon. David Ladd, Register of Copyrights
and Assistant Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services).
122. The Supreme Court majority recognized the need to protect the marketing of
both artistic and technological creativity in its balancing test regarding the sale of articles
of commerce which may be used to infringe copyrights. See supra notes 67-69 and accom-
panying text. The test balances the interest in effective reward to copyright owners on the
one hand with the interest of others to freely engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce on the other. 104 S. Ct. at 789. The dissent also recognized that the right to
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couraged without unduly restricting the other?125
The constitutional mechanism for the encouragement of "Science
and the useful Arts" is remuneration to authors and inventors.
124
Therefore, to encourage artistic creativity and technological invention
simultaneously, the least-conflicting means should be found to maximize
remuneration to the owners of both types of intellectual property.
12 5
III. TECHNOLOGIES SIMILAR TO BETAMAX
Throughout the history of copyright law, new technologies have pe-
riodically arisen which have thrown the relationship between copyright
owner and consumer out of balance. 126 When this has occurred, copy-
right law has been restructured to ensure that this balanced relationship,
based on the exclusive copyright protection, was reestablished. 127 The
challenge of VCR technology to the relationship between copyright
owner and consumer is unique, but it bears similarities to two technolo-
gies which in the recent past challenged copyright law to adapt and
grow. These technologies were rapid, efficient photocopying systems
and cable television systems.
Betamax technology is similar to photocopying technology in that
both permit the consumer to obtain a copy of a copyrighted work effi-
ciently, at low cost, and without direct remuneration to the copyright
owner. Betamax technology is similar to cable television retransmission
technology in that Betamax enables consumers to receive (through play-
back) programs at times which would otherwise not be possible, while
cable television technology enables viewers to receive signals which
would otherwise be too faint. A brief review of the response of the
courts and Congress to the challenges posed by photocopying and cable
television retransmission technologies is instructive in evaluating the
Supreme Court's decision in Sony.
market communications technologies must not be blocked by an overextension of copy-
right protection. 104 S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent's test is simply
weighted more heavily in favor of the copyright owner at the expense of the communica-
tions technology marketer. For a comparison of the majority and dissent tests, see supra
text accompanying notes 113-116.
123. Amid argued against holding the marketing of a new technology to be a contribu-
tory infringement on the theory that infringement would not occur without the new tech-
nology. Such a "but for" rule of contributory infringement would have a chilling effect on
invention and on the willingness of advertisers to market technological advances. Amicus
Curiae Brief in Support of the Consumer Electronics Group of the Electronic Industries
Ass'n at 16; Amicus Brief of McCann-Erickson, Inc., et al. at 3.
124. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
125. The means to maximize remuneration to patent owners would be to allow unfet-
tered marketing of the patented communications technology. The means to maximize re-
muneration to copyright owners would be a mechanism providing a fair payment for each
use of the copyrighted work. For a proposed least-conflicting means to maximize remu-
neration to the owners of both types of intellectual property, see infra notes 165-74 and
accompanying text.
126. See supra note 17.
127. See supra note 16.
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A. Photocopying
The early copyright acts gave the copyright owner the exclusive
right to make or authorize the making of copies of his work. 12 8 How-
ever, to accommodate scholars who wished to copy small portions of
copyrighted works in producing works of their own, the courts devel-
oped the doctrine of "fair use," permitting such minor copying.' 2 9 As
photocopying machines became capable of producing copies easily and
cheaply, concern grew that increasing photocopying in libraries and
schools threatened the market for copyrighted works.' 3 0
While Congress was considering revision of the Copyright Act, a
case came before the U.S. Court of Claims concerning the issue of li-
brary copying. In William & Wilkins Co. v. United States,13 1 a publisher of
medical journals brought suit against the National Institutes of Health
Library and the National Library of Medicine. The suit claimed that
these libraries had infringed copyrights by supplying large numbers of
photocopies of medical journal articles to medical researchers and prac-
titioners throughout the country. 13 2 In a controversial decision, the Wil-
liams & Wilkins court upheld the large scale copying by the two libraries
as fair use, in part on grounds that the harm to medical science which
would result from a halt to the photocopying of the articles outweighed
any harm to the publishers. ' 3 3 Following Williams & Wilkins, it appeared
that virtually any amount of photocopying was permissible as a fair use,
at least if done for research purposes.
134
The 1976 Copyright Act, however, set outside limits to photocopy-
ing of copyrighted works. Libraries are permitted to make single photo-
copies of journal articles for individual users, but before copying an
entire work or a substantial part of it, the library must determine that the
work could not be obtained from trade sources at a fair price.' 3 5 Photo-
copying in limited amounts for use by scholars, journalists and educa-
tors is permitted as a fair use.13 6
128. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
129. See, e.g., Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (dictum)
(quotation may be made from a copyrighted work for purposes of criticism). For a defini-
tion of the judicial doctrine of fair use as embodied in the 1976 Copyright Act, see supra
note 28.
130. Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law 25-26 (Comm. Print 1961).
131. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), af d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
132. Id. at 1346-49.
133. Id at 1356-59. See also id, at 1371-72 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
award of a reasonable royalty to the publisher would not harm medical science). For a
marketplace oriented criticism of the Williams & Wilkins decision, see Gordon, supra note 4,
at 1647-52.
134. For a viewpoint favoring broad public access to information and technologies, see
Note The Threatened Future of Home Video Recorders-Universal City Studios v. Sony, 31
DEPAUL L. REv. 643 (1982).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 108(d), (e) (1982).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). For a fuller exposition of § 107, see supra note 28. The
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act sets forth the texts of agreements between
representatives of copyright owners and educators establishing minimum guidelines for
fair use copying for educational purposes. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-
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To summarize, photocopying technology threatened to disrupt the
relationship between copyright owners and consumers because it ena-
bled consumers, in effect, to become publishers and provide themselves
with copies of copyrighted works without paying royalties to copyright
owners. Responding to this challenge, the Williams & Wilkins court per-
mitted large scale photocopying of journal articles for individual users
on grounds that it produced immediate social benefit in the encourage-
ment of scholarship and scientific discovery. 1 37 Congress, however, sig-
nificantly narrowed the Williams & Wilkins decision with the 1976
Copyright Act. 138 The Act permits limited photocopying, 13 9 but not on
a scale that threatens to disrupt the relationship between copyright
owner and consumer based on the exclusive copyright protection.'
40
B. Cable Television Retransmission
Early in the history of broadcasting, a broadcast was held to consti-
tute a public performance for profit, and thus to fall within the copyright
owner's monopoly right to authorize such performances.14 1 Later cases
held that a retransmission of the broadcast was also such a public per-
formance. For example, it was held that a hotel's retransmission of ra-
dio broadcasts through a public address system was a public
performance. 1
4 2
During the 1960s, cable television systems emerged for the purpose
of providing television broadcast signals to subscribing viewers who
lived in places where reception was too faint. The issue of whether such
retransmission constituted copyright infringement was addressed in
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 143 Taking a different ap-
proach from earlier cases, the Supreme Court held that cable television
systems were in effect acting as agents of the viewers, enhancing the
viewer's capacity to receive the broadcast signal.' 44 Thus, the retrans-
mission of broadcasts by cable systems did not constitute a performance
70, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5681-83. Concerning photocopy-
ing under the 1976 Copyright Act, see generally Barkstrom, Copyright: The Fine Art of Pro-
tecting the Fine Arts, 13 COLO. LAW. 1383, 1390-92 (1984).
137. 487 F.2d at 1362-63.
138. Congress viewed Williams & Wilkins as a "holding action" by the courts until Con-
gress could act. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1975).
139. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
141. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.)
(radio broadcast is public performance within meaning of 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 556 (1925).
142. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). See also Society of Euro-
pean Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1937) (hotel's retransmission of radio broadcast to speakers in hotel rooms is
public performance); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.
Pa, 1958) (use of wire systems to supply Muzak to subscribing businesses is public per-
formance), affd per curiam, 267 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1959). Retransmission by the manage-
ment of a hotel to private lodgings is now permitted as noninfringing. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (a)
(1982). Amplification of radio broadcasts by small retail establishments has recently been
found noninfringing. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
143. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
144. Id, at 399-401.
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within the meaning of the Copyright Act and did not constitute copy-
right infringement.
14 5
The 1976 Copyright Act returned to the approach of the pre-Fort-
nightly cases. The Act gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to
perform the copyrighted work publicly.' 4 6 The transmission of a per-
formance to the public is also a public performance.' 4 7 Since a trans-
mission of a performance is a performance, a retransmission is also a
performance. Thus, retransmission is within the copyright owner's ex-
clusive protection.' 48 If a cable system wishes to retransmit broadcasts,
the system must deposit semiannually with the Copyright Royalty Tribu-
nal a royalty fee reflecting use of the cable system by subscribers.' 4 9
These royalty fees are then distributed by the Tribunal to copyright
owners in amounts which reflect the consumption of an individual copy-
right owner's works by the public.
150
Thus, cable television technology threatened to disrupt the rela-
tionship between copyright owners and consumers because it enabled
cable systems to conduct public performances of copyrighted works for
viewers without paying royalties to copyright owners.151 Responding to
this challenge, the Fortnightly Court decided that cable television trans-
mission should be considered a noninfringing use. 15 2 Congress, how-
ever, essentially reversed the Fortnightly decision with the 1976
Copyright Act.153 The Act permits retransmission, but also provides a
scheme for remuneration to copyright owners, 15 4 which restores the re-
lationship between copyright owner and consumer based on the copy-
right protection.
145. Id at 400-02. The Fortnightly holding was extended to include retransmission of
signals not intended to be received in the subscribing area in Teleprompter Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974). Plaintiffs in Teleprompter argued that
because cable television system operators play a major role in the retransmission of copy-
righted works, the operators should be held liable for contributory infringement. Id. at
403-04. (The Sony Supreme Court dissent engaged in a similar analysis with regard to
contributory infringement by VCR manufacturers. See supra notes 87-91 and accompany-
ing text.) The Teleprompter Court, however, declined to apply such a "but for" test.
Rather, the Court indicated that resolution of the contributory infringement issue de-
pended on a determination of the function cable television retransmitters play in the total
process of television broadcasting and reception. 392 U.S. at 408.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
148. l A cable television system operator may retransmit by making a videotape copy
of a broadcast and retransmitting at a later time. 17 U.S.C. § 11 (e) (1982).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982). The cable television retransmitter must obtain a li-
cense. The cable television system may only retransmit those stations which the FCC per-
mits it to transmit. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982).
150. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is able to calculate proper remuneration to indi-
vidual copyright owners based on viewer information provided by each cable television
system. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982).
151. For a discussion of the relationship between copyright owner and consumer, see
infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
153. The Fortnightly Court characterized retransmitters as agents of the viewers. Fort-
nightly, 392 U.S. at 399-401. The 1976 Copyright Act required retransmitters' licensees to
pay royalties to copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982).
154. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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C. Comparison
The courts responded in a similar way to the challenges of photo-
copying and cable television technology. In both Williams & Wilkins and
Fortnightly, the courts acted to permit extensive use of the new technol-
ogy, and broad access for consumers to information communicated by
the new technology, without remuneration to copyright owners. Con-
gress, however, later acted to restrict sharply the scope of noninfringing
uses of these technologies and structured royalty schemes ensuring re-
muneration to copyright owners for use of their works.
The Supreme Court responded to the challenge of VCR technology
in a manner similar to the response of the courts to photocopying and
cable television retransmission technology. The majority acted to per-
mit extensive use of VCR technology and broad access for consumers to
information communicated by VCRs without remuneration to copyright
owners. If the pattern continues, Congress will act to restrict sharply
the scope of noninfringing uses of VCRs or structure a royalty scheme
ensuring remuneration to copyright owners for use of their works.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Copyright Marketplace
Underlying the constitutional theory that the granting of a limited
copyright monopoly to authors will ultimately result in the public
good,' 55 is the premise that an economic marketplace exists where indi-
vidual consumers can interact with copyright owners and their publish-
ers.' 56 This premised marketplace acts to provide a forum in which the
measure of the value of an author's work to society is determined by the
amount of remuneration which an author receives from purchases of his
work by individual consumers. 157 Having received through remunera-
tion from consumers an indication that his works are socially valuable,
the author will theoretically continue to produce such works and the
public will be further benefited.'
58
155. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In advocating a congressional copyright
and patent power, James Madison wrote: "The public good fully coincides ... with the
claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, (J. Madison) (E. Bourne ed. 1901).
156. The theories of Adam Smith and like-minded economists hold that the unre-
strained economic marketplace is the best means of satisfying both the needs of participat-
ing individuals and the needs of society as a whole. See generally A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (0. Piest ed. 1961); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962). Mar-
ketplace theories also underlie constitutional freedom of speech. Broad protection is
given particularly to speech of a political nature on the theory that the political debates of
society are best resolved in the "marketplace of ideas." See, e.g., Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
157. See generally R. POZNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-72 (2d ed. 1977).
158. The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant pat-
ents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in "Science and the useful Arts." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (dictum). See
also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) (dictum) (copyright provides
incentive to further creative efforts).
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In some instances, however, this theoretical marketplace fails to
function. 15 9 One such situation occurs when consumers can enjoy an
individual's work without remunerating him for his efforts. 16° VCR
technology threatens such a marketplace malfunction. Through use of
the VCR, programs can be copied off the air, edited to remove commer-
cials, and watched at a later time.1 6 1 When a VCR consumer watches a
copyrighted work without watching the accompanying commercial
messages, the consumer does not provide a basis for remuneration to
the creative artist who originated the copyrighted work; advertisers will
not pay for that part of an audience which does not watch their
messages. 16 2 If the creator of the work does not receive remuneration,
theoretically the creative artist will not produce additional works. 163
Thus, if the marketplace fails to provide remuneration to copyright own-
ers, consumers will be deprived of additional works from the creative
artist. In addition, consumers will be deprived of the ability to allocate
social resources to producing additional works. 16 4
B. Provision of Royalties
In order to rectify the marketplace malfunction created by VCR
technology, Congress should enact legislation providing a reasonable
159. For example, the theoretical marketplace could fail to provide proper indication
to an author of the value of his work if transaction costs involved in purchasing the work
(such as contacting the seller, arranging and paying for delivery, etc.) are too great to
make purchase possible for the individual consumer. In this situation, the author receives
no indication whether his work is socially valuable, because no one purchases his work. An
author so situated is not likely to produce additional works, though they might be socially
valuable. Thus, the public good would be frustrated by market failure resulting from high
transaction costs. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 1628-29.
160. Intellectual property is easily transferred from one person to another. The supply
of the property is unlimited once it is produced. Thus, control of intellectual property is
inherently difficult. See, e.g., Mansfield, Contribution of Research and Development to Economic
Growth in the United States, in PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 186-91 (E. Mansfield ed.
1974).
161. See supra note 5.
162. The portion of the broadcast audience not watching commercials is hard to gauge.
A Sony Corp. survey indicated that only 25% of Betamax owners fast-forward through
commercials. 480 F. Supp. at 468. Another source indicates that from 40 to 85% of VCR
owners "skip commercials or erase them." Survey of Media Statistics, Inc., Brief for Re-
spondent on Reargument at 6. At any rate, it does seem clear that VCR owners are less
valuable to advertisers than are off-the-air viewers. Brief Amicus Curiae of CBS, Inc. in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2.
163. Claims of copyright infringement in the television broadcast field require an anal-
ysis of compensation paid to the copyright owner. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394, 411-13 (1974). For a discussion of techniques by
which economic harm from the copying of copyrighted works may be determined, see
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale
Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases,
28 ST. Louis U.LJ. 647 (1984).
164. The decision of the Sony Supreme Court majority in effect endorsed a continua-
tion of the marketplace malfunction with regard to VCR technology until and unless Con-
gress acts. For a discussion of the efforts of Congress to balance copyright interests in
light of the Sony decision, see Note, VCR Home Recording and Title 17: Does Congress Have the
Answer to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc?, 35 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 793
(1984).
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royalty to copyright owners of broadcast works.16 5 Such a royalty could
be collected as part of the purchase price of blank videocassettes.1
6 6
The royalties could be distributed to copyright owners through the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal.' 6 7 Each copyright owner would receive
royalties commensurate with the copyright owner's share of the VCR
audience, as determined by Nielson-type ratings.
168
Collection of royalties as part of the purchase price of videocas-
settes is the most equitable means of remunerating copyright owners.1
6 9
If the VCR consumer is making a noninfringing use of his VCR 170 or is
timeshifting, he will require far fewer tapes and therefore pay fewer roy-
alties. 171 If the consumer is "library-building," however, a more egre-
gious direct infringement of copyright, he will require far more tapes,
165. A number of experts have indicated that the economic incentives of copyright
owners will be undermined if VCR use is permitted without remuneration. See, e.g., Senate
Hearings, supra note 58, at 55-64 (statement of Sidney Sheinberg, President and Chief Op-
erating Officer of MCA, Inc.); Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 356-421 (statement of Hon.
David Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian of Congress for Copyright
Services); Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 457-460 (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
Motion Picture Association of America); House Hearings, supra note 58, at 589-98 (statement
of Hon. Frank Hodsoll, Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts); House Hearings, supra
note 58, at 611-94 (statement of Hon. David Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant
Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services).
166. The royalty would be collected as a reasonable fixed amount added to the price of
each videocassette. Royalty arrangements are currently found in the Copyright Act in a
number of places. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b) (2), 111 (1982) (compulsory royalties for secondary
transmissions by cable television systems); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982) (royalties set by law on
the copying and distribution of phonograph records); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982) (royalties for
public performances by jukeboxes); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1982) (royalties for the use of works
in noncommercial broadcasts).
167. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is an independent agency under the legislative
branch. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1982). It is composed of five commissioners appointed for
seven-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 17 U.S.C.
§ 802 (1982). The Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine royalty rates. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
115, 116, 118 (1982). It is also responsible for receiving and distributing royalty fees. 17
U.S.C. § 111(d), 116(c), 801(b) (1982).
168. Nielson-type ratings systems are capable of measuring the viewing preferences of
the VCR audience. See supra note 80. A royalty distribution system based on viewer pref-
erences is currently administered by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal in the area of cable
television retransmissions. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
169. The VCR and the videocassette tapes it requires have been likened to a "razor and
blades" marketing situation. In other words, the major long-term profits to be made from
VCR technology will come not from the sale of VCRs (the "razor"), but from the sale of
videocassettes (the "blades"). Bus. WK., October 29, 1976, at 29.
170. See supra note 105. Attorneys are making increasing use of VCRs for videotaped
depositions and preparation of witnesses. One court has pioneered a system whereby di-
rect and cross examinations are presented to the jury on a VCR, with objections and other
procedural arguments edited out.
Traditional fair use considerations, see supra notes 44-46, would seem to dictate that
users of VCR copies for "productive" purposes such as teaching should be exempt from
the payment of copyright royalties on videocassettes. Congress could establish such an
exemption in conjunction with a statutory provision for royalty payments. To simplify the
exemption, perhaps blank videocassette sales to educational institutions could be handled
by special distributors exempt from royalty payments. Guidelines for classroom use of off-
the-air taping have been proposed and supported by educators and industry representa-
tives. 127 CONG. REC. E4751 (daily ed. October 14, 1981).
171. Generally, with timeshifting use and noninfringing use, the VCR consumer
records on the tape and then records over the same tape for the next use.
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and thus will pay more royalties.' 72
Congress should act promptly to provide reasonable royalties to
copyright owners of broadcast works.' 73 It is time to acknowledge the
continuing contribution of copyright owners to the VCR revolution by
bringing VCR use within the exclusive copyright protection. 7 4
Kim Ikeler
172. "Library-building" is the practice of recording many broadcast works and saving
each tape for later viewings, thus accumulating a "library."
173. Among the bills introduced in Congress concerning VCR use following the court
of appeals decision in Sony (see supra note 58) was H.R. 5488, introduced by Rep. Edwards.
Rep. Edwards' bill would exempt home VCR use as noninfringing and provide for pay-
ment of royalty fees by manufacturers and importers of videorecorders and blank tapes.
See House Hearings, supra note 58, at 1105-1118 (reproduction of H.R. 5488, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982)). In the Senate, Sen. Mathias introduced amendment 1333 to S. 1758. This
amendment would exempt off-the-air home VCR recording from the copyright protection,
while providing remuneration to copyright owners. Under Sen. Mathias' amendment,
manufacturers and importers who distribute hardware or blank tape would pay royalties
under a compulsory license at rates set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (see supra note
167). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal would then distribute the royalties to copyright
owners. Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 335-55 (reproduction of Amendment No. 1333 to
S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)).
In early 1983, Sen. Mathias introduced S. 3 1, which provided for collection of royalty
fees by the Register of Copyrights and distribution of royalties by the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal to copyright owners. Senate Bill 31 featured a compulsory licensing scheme
under which manufacturers and importers of VCRs and blank videotapes would pay royal-
ties at rates set by negotiation or arbitration. Home VCR consumers would be exempt
from infringement liability. Video and Audio Home Taping: Hearings on S. 31 and S. 175 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-47 (reproduction of S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)).
174. With an estimated five million VCR households being added each year, for a total
of 35 million households by 1988, there is no question that VCR use is in a revolutionary
expansion period. The Video Revolution, NEWSWEEK, supra note.23, at 52.

